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INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: THE U.S. JURISDICTION
TO PRESCRIBE AND THE DOCTRINE
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
ALLAN I. MENDELSOHN*
I. INTRODUCTION
INCE THE 1945 decision by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (colloquially known as the
"Alcoa" case), it has become well-established law that the Sher-
man Antitrust Act-legislation that was adopted over 100 years
ago-applies to and prohibits conduct in foreign countries if
that conduct has an illegal "effect" in the United States.2 The
very important issue today is the extent to which the Sherman
Act and other U.S. legislation applies to conduct in foreign
countries and the circumstances in which it can be applied.
This issue is of substantial importance, especially because recent
United States Supreme Court decisions do not clearly define the
exact reach and limits of U.S. jurisdiction on the international
scene. In the United States, this jurisdiction is now known as
the 'jurisdiction to prescribe"-in contrast to the jurisdiction
that we all know as the jurisdiction to adjudicate.3
* Mr. Mendelsohn is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Transportation Affairs. He currently practices law with the firm of Sher &
Blackwell in Washington, D.C., and he is also an adjunct professor of
international transportation law and conflicts of law at the Georgetown University
Law Center. This article is adapted and updated from a lecture the author
presented in October 2007 at the University of Genoa Law School in Genoa, Italy
to students in the European Union II courses within the framework of the Law
School's Paolo Fresco Lectures program.
1 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
2 See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at
444; RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 455, reporter's note 3 (1987).
3 See RESTATEMENT (THImD) Or FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 402-16.
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In the Alcoa case, a group of foreign companies (including a
company owned by Alcoa, but incorporated in Canada) agreed
on quotas to restrict worldwide aluminum production and distri-
bution, including in the United States.4 The U.S. government
brought a criminal action against the companies, and the par-
ties were found guilty of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act
by conspiring to restrict importation of aluminum into the
United States.5
The number of important similar cases, both civil and crimi-
nal, that have been brought under the Sherman Act since the
1945 Alcoa decision would be difficult to count. Only the U.S.
government brings criminal actions under the Sherman Act.6
Private litigants, on the other hand, bring civil actions and seek
to collect treble damages if a violation is found.7 It is not at all
unusual for the U.S. government to bring a criminal action, for
the offending parties to either plead or be found guilty, and
then for private parties to bring civil suits seeking treble dam-
ages. The cost of engaging in conduct that violates the U.S. anti-
trust laws is thus so substantial as to discourage all but the most
dedicated (or elusive) from engaging in such conduct.
II. POST-ALCOA ANTITRUST DECISIONS
A discussion of post-Alcoa cases must include not only the in-
terplay between the U.S. and U.K. governments in the quite fa-
mous Laker' cases, but also the most recent antitrust cases that
were brought, apparently jointly, by the United States and the
European Commission ("EC") against British Airways ("BA"),
Virgin Atlantic Airlines, Lufthansa, Korean Airways, and other
international air carriers for fixing cargo and certain passenger
rates on North Atlantic and Pacific travel. Though a late starter,
the EC is now very enthusiastic, and in various ways is even more
enthusiastic than the United States about its jurisdiction to pre-
scribe, in which the EC applies its competition law, particularly
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, to conduct, wherever
4 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422-23.
5 Id. at 445.
6 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER (1996),
available at http://pueblo.gsa.gov/cic-text/misc/antitrust/antitrus.htm.
7 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914).
8 See infra part II A.
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it may occur, that has an anti-competive effect within the Euro-
pean community states.9
But before getting to these most recent cases, three very im-
portant antitrust cases must be considered. All three-two of
which reached the Supreme Court-have been of critical signifi-
cance in helping to determine the limits of U.S. jurisdiction to
prescribe.
The first of these is the so-called Lake? ° case, which involved
Freddy Laker, an Englishman who was the first entrepreneur to
establish a truly transatlantic low-cost air carrier.1 Though his
airline closed after less than five years of operations, Laker left a
trail of some of the most important litigation in the U.S.
courts. 2 The second case is the so-called insurance antitrust
case that was litigated in the early 1990s and decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1993-Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. v. California.3 The third case is the 2004 Supreme Court
decision in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran.14 Each of
these cases has been of unique importance in American and in-
ternational law.
A. THE LAKER LITIGATION
Freddie Laker, later to be knighted by Queen Elizabeth on
the recommendation of Margaret Thatcher and known as "Sir
Freddie," started his airline service to the United States in Sep-
tember 1977 and shut it down in February 1982.'" It was a suc-
cessful "discount" service that reached a level of some forty
weekly scheduled transatlantic flights. 6 Some say that he was
forced to shut down because he had overextended himself.' 7 Sir
9 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 81, 82, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 4.
10 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C.
1983).
11 Sam Knight, Cheap Hights Pioneer Sir Freddie Laker Dies, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 10,
2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article729420.ece.
12 See infra notes part II A.
13 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
14 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
15 See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
121-36 (3d ed. 1993) for a more extensive discussion of all the Laker litigation.
The author uses Professor Lowenfeld's casebook in teaching his Georgetown Law
School course on International Conflicts of Law and wishes to express his appre-
ciation to Professor Lowenfeld for the excellence and timeliness of his casebook.
16 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1126
(D.D.C. 1983); LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 122.
17 LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 122.
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Freddie, however, claimed that his shutdown was because of an
antitrust conspiracy by BA and others (including Pan Am, TWA,
and other major International Air Transport Association carri-
ers) that included predatory price-cutting and other illegal con-
duct.' The case, which Sir Freddie originally filed in the U.S.
federal district court in Washington, D.C. seeking treble dam-
ages under the Sherman Act, turned out to be a marathon of
international litigation.' 9
Very shortly after Laker's Washington, D.C. filing, BA brought
an action in London seeking a declaration of "non-liability" to
Laker and an injunction preventing Laker from continuing his
suit in Washington. 20 After all, so BA argued, both airlines were
British carriers, and there was simply no reason for a dispute
between them to be litigated in a U.S. court.21 The London
court agreed and ordered Laker to discontinue his suit in Wash-
ington. 22 Laker then immediately appealed the London deci-
23sion. Within days of that appeal, however, Judge Greene in
the Washington, D.C. federal district court enjoined Pan Am,
TWA, and the other defendant airlines from joining BA's
London suit and ordered a full hearing.24
Meanwhile, the British Government issued an order prevent-
ing BA from complying with any discovery or other order of the
federal court in Washington, D.C. and from providing any docu-
ments or other evidence to the plaintiffs there.25 On appeal
from the lower court in London, the London appeals court is-
sued a permanent injunction preventing Laker from pursuing
the Washington, D.C. action.26 At the same time, however, the
U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Greene. 27 The appellate
court concluded that the "prescriptive jurisdiction of the United
States antitrust laws unequivocally holds that the antitrust laws
18 Laker Airways, 559 F. Supp. at 1126-27; LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 122.
19 LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 121-36.
20 Id. at 122.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 123.
24 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1126
(D.D.C. 1983).
25 LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 123.
26 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] Q.B. 142, 169 (U.K.).
27 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 956
(D.C. Cir. 1984). Judge Kenneth Starr dissented from the decision, stating that it
would "be viewed by many of our friends and allies as a rather parochial Ameri-
can outlook." Id. at 956, 958.
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should be applied," and that the case should move forward not-
withstanding what was happening in London.28
At that point, no one was prepared to predict who would
blink. But in a scholarly and exhaustively well-reasoned deci-
sion, Sir Kenneth Diplock, of the U.K. House of Lords, con-
cluded that, even though both Laker and BA were British
carriers, the U.S. courts nevertheless had jurisdiction over both
the parties and the subject matter.29 Lord Diplock stated that it
would be improper for an English court to enjoin Sir Freddie
from pursuing a remedy for an alleged antitrust violation in the
only court where such a remedy is available. ° And thus, one of
the most fascinating and serious international legal confronta-
tions came to a close-but not without definitively: (1) affirming
the applicability of the U.S. antitrust laws in a modern interna-
tional context, (2) affirming the willingness of U.S. courts to
provide a remedy for a foreign plaintiff no different than would
be provided to a U.S. plaintiff, and (3) possibly discouraging le-
gal practices that have come to be known as anti-suit injunctions
or parallel litigation.
B. HARTFORD FRE INSURANCE V. CALIFORNIA:
THE INSURANCE ANTITRUST CASE
The second critical case concerning U.S. jurisdiction to pre-
scribe was a civil suit brought under the Sherman Act by the
Attorneys General of nineteen states and by numerous private
parties. 1 The suit charged that several American and foreign
insurance companies, and especially a number of underwriters
at Lloyd's of London, had unlawfully agreed to certain new rules
that had the effect of making various forms of insurance and
reinsurance unavailable in the U.S. market.3 2 These new rules,
the plaintiffs argued, eliminated so-called "occurrence-based
coverage and allowed only "claims-made coverage. ' 3 This
change became very important in the context of the asbestos
28 Id.
29 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1985] A.C. 58, 59-60 (H.L.) (ap-
peal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
30 Id. at 80, 93-95.
31 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
32 Id. at 769, 795.
33 Id. at 771, 795, 810.
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claims in the United States and also the recurring litigation in-
volving underground chemical pollution. 4
Under occurrence-based coverage, it made no difference
when the damage occurred, so long as it occurred when the pol-
icy was in effect, for example, when the asbestos was installed or
when the underground chemical pollution originally oc-
curred. 5 In other words, insurers could almost never close their
books on a policy even though the policy was written only for a
limited period of time. 6 Under claims-made coverage, if the
policy was for a specific time period, a claim would have to be
made within that period or be barred forever. 7
The American plaintiffs argued, and the Lloyd's of London
defendants did not dispute, that the problems for the U.S. mar-
ket all resulted from the fact that it was the London-based com-
panies that had formulated the new policy and had agreed not
to reinsure any U.S. insurance companies except for claims-
made coverage. 8 The London defendants argued, on the other
hand, that what they had agreed to was perfectly legal in the
United Kingdom and in full compliance with a regime of regula-
tion that had been approved by the British Parliament. 9 In
short, the defendants argued, if the conduct was legal where
conceived and adopted, it should not be subject to the extrater-
ritorial reach of U.S. law.40
After some six years of litigation, the United States Supreme
Court ultimately held that so long as British law did not require
the British underwriters to act as they did, there was no conflict
between British law and U.S. antitrust law.4' Therefore, U.S. an-
titrust law could legally be applied to the conduct of the British
underwriters.42 In other words, if the law of the foreign country
where the action was taken did not require the action to be
taken, then there was no true conflict of laws, and thus the U.S.
antitrust laws could apply if the action-even if legal where
34 GEORGE B. FLANIGAN, KATHLEEN A. MCCULLOUGH, & CHARLES R. McGuiRE,
JR., OCCURRENCE AND CLAIMS MADE: THE ROAD BEHIND AND THE ROAD AHEAD 8,
11-12 (2004).
35 See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 771.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 773-78.
39 Id. at 797-99.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 799.
42 See id. at 797-99.
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taken-resulted in unlawful effects in the United States.4" This
is perhaps the furthest extension of the prescriptive jurisdiction
of the United States approved by the United States Supreme
Court.
C. F. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE LTD. v. EMPAGRAN
F. Hoffman - La Roche happens to be one of the most recent,
as well as one of the most fascinating, antitrust cases raising the
issue of the reach of the U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction. Begin-
ning in 1989 and continuing for some ten years, a group of for-
eign drug manufacturers, led by F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. of
Switzerland and BASF of Germany, entered into worldwide mar-
ket sharing and price-fixing arrangements for the sale of various
vitamins used as nutritional supplements.44 Although no U.S.
company was involved in the conspiracy, the foreign companies
all supplied U.S. companies and otherwise did business in the
United States.45
In May 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. and BASF had pleaded guilty to a
worldwide criminal conspiracy and had agreed to pay fines of
$500 million and $225 million, respectively. 46 Other foreign
firms later pleaded guilty and paid substantial fines.47 Signifi-
cantly, on this occasion the EC also later weighed in, fining F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. and seven other companies 855 mil-
lion for participating in the conspiracy.48 Shortly thereafter, pri-
vate U.S. lawyers began to file civil suits seeking treble
damages.49 Most of these cases-which did not include any for-
eign plaintiffs-were settled with payments in excess of $1 bil-
lion.5' The question that came to the United States Supreme
43 See id. at 799.
44 Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, F. Hoffmann-La Roche and BASP Agree
to Pay Record Fines for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel (May 20,
1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/May/196at.htm.
45 David Barboza, Six Big Vitamin Makers Are Said to Agree to Pay $1.1 Billion to
Settle Pricing Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999, at C2.
46 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 44.
47 See, e.g., Barboza, supra note 45, at C2; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Canadian Vitamin Company Agrees to Plead Guilty for Role in International Vita-
min Cartel (Sept. 29, 1999), http://justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1999/
3726.htm.
48 James Kanter, A Crackdown on Cartels by European Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2005, at C3.
49 Brenda Sandburg, Culture Shock: Chinese Companies are Learning Some Painful
Lessons About the American Way of Litigation, CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2006, at 63.
50 Barboza, supra note 45, at C2.
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Court in 2004 was whether U.S. antitrust laws provided a remedy
for foreign plaintiffs who were damaged by the unlawful con-
spiracy but whose purchases from the conspirators involved de-
livery of the vitamins outside the United States.5
In a lengthy and well-reasoned decision, Supreme Court Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer concluded that the U.S. antitrust laws were
not intended to apply to foreign conduct that caused damage to
foreigners abroad.52 If foreign countries wished to protect their
citizens and provide them a remedy against anti-competitive
conduct, it was up to them to do so; it was not for the United
States to do so in the absence of such a remedy in the foreign
country.5" Justice Breyer also pointed out that several foreign
countries had filed amicus briefs in the case, arguing that to ap-
ply the treble damage remedy of the Sherman Act would unjusti-
fiably allow the citizens of these foreign countries "to bypass
their own less generous remedial schemes." 54 Justice Breyer
then laid down what could be very important law for future pre-
scriptive jurisdiction cases in the United States: "[I]f America's
antitrust policies could not win their own way in the interna-
tional marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume,
would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperial-
ism, through legislative fiat."55
III. THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Two other areas of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction-securities
law and maritime law-will be considered in this Article to show
the similarities and differences in the ways that the United States
applies its prescriptive jurisdiction in these areas. But before do-
ing so, it would be useful to focus on another very important
emerging area of U.S. law that in fact suggests an unusually in-
teresting trend in the development of U.S. law and practice on
the international scene. This is an area in which, as in F. Hoff-
mann-La Roche, it seems that the United States is becoming in-
creasingly reluctant to open its courts and to grant its generous
remedies to foreign plaintiffs.
The public is well aware of the many international aviation
crashes that have occurred in recent years and of the tragic
51 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004).
52 Id. at 164.
53 Id. at 165.
54 Id. at 167.
5 Id. at 167-69.
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events that accompany these disasters. What we rarely, if ever,
focus on, however, is the litigation that is brought after the trag-
edy by the victims' survivors. In almost all of these cases, the
plaintiffs bring their suits in the United States.56 For example, a
case was recently brought in the U.S. federal district court in
Miami, Florida by the survivors of the 160 victims of a crash that
occurred in Venezuela in August 2005. 5 ' All 160 victims were
foreign citizens, the airline was of foreign (Colombian) registry
that did not operate or do business in the United States, and the
accident occurred on a trip between two foreign points. 58 In
short, there was almost no connection between any aspect of the
accident and the United States (except for an individual who
lived in Florida and who helped to arrange for the airline to
provide the flights between the two foreign points).59
The role played by the Florida resident was very minor. Even
if it had been major, it would have been appropriate to-as was
done-file a motion promptly in the Miami court for a transfer
based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This is a com-
mon-law doctrine that has been developing in the United States
for at least the past fifty years and that permits a court to transfer
a case to another court when it concludes that certain public
and private interest factors weigh in favor of such a transfer.6 °
The doctrine of forum non conveniens should be used in every
aviation crash case when foreign victims or their survivors sue in
U.S. courts.6
There is almost no aviation crash today that does not involve
victims of multiple nationalities, including U.S. nationals.62
Under forum non conveniens, the issue of liability-that is, who
was responsible for the crash: the airline, the pilots, air traffic
control, the airline manufacturer, etc.-would be determined
56 See e.g., Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001).




60 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
61 See Allan I. Mendelsohn & Renee Lieux, The Warsaw Convention Article 28, the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, and the Foreign Plaintiff 68J. AIR L. & COM. 75,
111 (2003) [hereinafter The Foreign Plaintiff]; Allan I. Mendelsohn, Recent Develop-
ments in the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 52 FED. LAw. 45, 46 (2005) [hereinafter
Recent Developments].
62 See, e.g., World Briefing: Americas: Cuba: 17 Die in Plane Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 2002, at A6; Edward Cargan, Over 200 Die as TaiwanJet Crashes in Bad Weather,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A3.
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by the U.S. court.6 3 Once liability has been largely determined
(or if it is admitted or stipulated to by the participating defend-
ants in the case), then under forum non conveniens, every for-
eign plaintiff should be transferred to his or her domicile court
for determination by that court-not by the U.S. court-of the
damages he or she is entitled to receive.64
It is no secret why foreign plaintiffs prefer to sue in the
United States. There are basically two reasons. First, they can
find excellent lawyers, highly experienced in aviation tort law,
who will handle their cases on a contingency fee basis.65 This
means that the lawyers will charge nothing to take and handle
the case and will receive their fees only on the basis of a percent-
age of whatever they recover. Second, it is well known that re-
coveries in the United States, for a number of reasons, are much
more generous than they are anywhere else in the world.66
It seems, however, that for many of the same reasons Justice
Breyer did not want to export U.S. law or engage in "legal impe-
rialism" in F. Hoffmann-La Roche,67 U.S. courts handling aviation
disaster cases today likewise believe that foreigners should be
compensated under the laws of their domiciles rather than
under the laws of the United States.68 If under the laws of their
domiciles they receive only, say, twenty-five percent of what they
would receive in the United States, or if they are required to pay
a lawyer even to take their case because there is no contingency
fee system in their domiciles, the United States, in the words of
Justice Breyer, should not "tr[y] to impose [the U.S. system] in
an act of legal imperialism. 69
In both the antitrust and the aviation contexts, foreign plain-
tiffs are trying to use the U.S. system and U.S. approaches to
litigation. It is questionable whether the United States should
permit this. It would be better if plaintiffs, as foreign citizens,
work to prevail on their governments to pass laws and adopt ap-
proaches to litigation that are more similar to those of the
United States or, in any event, that are more consistent with the
63 Recent Developments, supra note 61, at 46.
6 Id.
65 The Foreign Plaintiff supra note 61, at 111.
66 Id.
67 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004).
- See, e.g., Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic
of China, 923 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1991).
69 F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 168.
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interests of plaintiffs in those countries and in these types of
cases. 
70
The Florida case is the first case anywhere in the world to
raise the issue whether under the Montreal Convention,7 1
adopted in 1999 largely to replace the 1929 Warsaw Conven-
tion, 72 a U.S. court can apply the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens to transfer cases to the courts where the foreign
plaintiffs live.73 Recently, the federal district court in Miami
handed down its decision, holding that the 1999 Montreal Con-
vention allows U.S. courts to apply the forum non conveniens
doctrine and directing the foreign plaintiffs to their domicile
courts in Martinique. 4
IV. SECURITIES LAW AND MARITIME LAW
No article on the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States
can be complete without at least touching on the subjects of se-
curities law and maritime law. U.S. securities law is full of cases
where U.S. courts have allowed the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 to apply to transactions with a foreign twist.75 U.S. mari-
time law, perhaps in recognition of the long history of interna-
tional maritime law, seems reluctant to extend the application
70 It was recently reported that French President Nicolas Sarkozy had publicly
suggested that the EC consider adopting a form of class action lawsuit not unlike
that commonly used by plaintiffs in the United States for antitrust and securities
fraud litigation. See Caroline Byrne & Cary O'Reilly, Sarkozy, U.S. Lawyers Shift
Class-Action Suits to Europe, N.Y. SUN, July 25, 2007, available at http://www.nysun.
com/article/59069.
71 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, ICAO Doc. 9148.
72 Bin Cheng, A New Era in the Law of Int'l Carriage by Air: From Warsaw (1929) to
Montreal (1999), 53 IrNr'L & CoM. L. Q. 833, 833 (2004).
73 See In re W. Caribbean Airways, 32 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 15,595 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 26, 2007) (preliminary order by Federal District Court Judge Ungaro).
74 In her decision, Judge Ungaro comprehensively examined all the debates
that took place at the 1999 diplomatic conference in connection with the issue of
forum non conveniens and concluded that the conference's legislative history
established that the doctrine was available as a procedural tool for use by U.S.
courts. Id. She then ordered the parties to brief the issue whether, in the partic-
ular circumstances of the case, forum non conveniens should be granted and the
160 plaintiffs directed to their domicile courts in Martinique. Id. Following the
submission of briefs on this issue,Judge Ungaro, on November 9, 2007, issued an
order dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds and directing the
plaintiffs to the courts in Martinique. See id. 115,764. Judge Ungaro's decision is
now on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals (Case No. 07-
15828).
75 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968).
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of U.S. law for almost any purpose 76-except the limited (and
exceedingly difficult to understand) areas that were involved in
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Spector v. Norwegian
Cruise Line Ltd.77
Almost all the cases arising in securities law are litigated under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.78 This
section makes it unlawful for any person through "any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . to use [in the
purchase or sale of any security] any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions [as the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")]
may prescribe ... in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."79 It is clear that this is a very broad statute that would
seem to have almost universal application.
For the most part, and given the history of dozens of cases
that have involved securities fraud, including the famous 1972
decision in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,"° (in
which Chief Judge Henry Friendly held against Robert Maxwell,
a well-known British citizen), it may fairly be said that U.S. secur-
ities law will be applied to the following types of cases:
1. Cases in which the losses were incurred by U.S. residents,
wherever the unlawful acts occurred;
2. Cases in which the losses were incurred by U.S. citizens
abroad, but only if the unlawful acts occurred mostly in
the United States; 2 and
3. Cases in which the losses were incurred by foreigners
outside the United States, but only if the unlawful acts oc-
curred in the United States and were the direct cause of
the harm."
Perhaps the best line of cases illustrating the problems in this
area are those that arose out of the collapse in the late 1960s of
the quite famous Bernard Cornfeld group of companies.8 4
These companies were known colloquially and alternatively as
76 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953).
77 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
78 See generally Carlos L. Israels, Banks and Federal Securities Regulation, 85 BANK-
ING L.J. 1 (1968); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(j) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007).
-9 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(0).
80 468 F.2d 1326, 1344 (2d Cir. 1972).
81 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968).
82 See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir. 1975).
83 See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991).
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the Investors Overseas Services ("IOS") Fund, the Cornfeld
Fund, or the Fund of Funds.85 The companies had perfected
the American style of selling mutual funds, but sold only to cus-
tomers outside the United States and thus were not subject to
SEC jurisdiction. 86 As it would happen, some of the shares en-
ded up in the hands of twenty-two U.S. citizens residing in the
United States.87 When the stock collapsed, a class action suit was
brought on behalf of the twenty-two citizens and on behalf of all
purchasers, wherever located.
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., the court found in favor of the
twenty-two U.S. citizens but dismissed the cases brought by the
foreigners, because the unlawful acts did not occur mostly in the
United States.89 In the companion case of IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
the court concluded that a foreign corporation was entitled to
bring suit against another foreign corporation because planning
of the operation and legal drafting of the major documents oc-
curred in New York.9 ° Indeed, Judge Friendly went so far as to
conclude, "[w]e do not think Congress intended to allow the
United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent
security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to
foreigners."91
It is hard to be certain about the extent to which foreigners,
who buy their securities abroad, can sue in the United States. If
one predicts on the basis of the F. Hoffmann-La Roche decision,
all foreigners may be excluded. But if securities law is treated
differently than antitrust law, as at least one judge has recently
concluded,9 2 then the mere fact that the fraudulent security de-
vices were created in the United States may open U.S. courts to
suits by foreigners who bought those securities abroad.9
Now, this Article will address maritime law, which is relatively
easy. Many years ago, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") brought suit in order to allow U.S. unions to organize




89 See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987, 991, 1001.
90 See 1IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975); LOWENFELD,
supra note 15, at 107.
91 liT, 519 F.2d at 1017.
92 In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 356 n.10
(2004).
93 See also the extended discussion of the securities cases in LOWENFELD, supra
note 15, at 76-111.
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the all-foreign crews aboard shiplines that regularly plied the
U.S. trades and that were owned in whole or large part by U.S.
owners, but which flew foreign flags-then of Panama, Liberia
and Honduras. 4 These vessels came to be known as "flags of
convenience. '95 The owners "flagged-out, '96 so it was called, pri-
marily to avoid taxes and to be able to hire foreign crews free
from any modern day labor law requirements. 7
The history that followed can be summed up quickly. The
district court found for the NLRB, but the court of appeals re-
versed.98 When the case went to the Supreme Court in 1963,
the Court decided that no matter the vessels' U.S. ownership or
trade routes to and from the U.S., the law of the flag governed
in maritime law.99 The Court also held that the NLRB had no
jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act to interfere
in any way with the internal affairs of the vessels, including of
course the labor relations of the foreign crews aboard the
vessels.' 0
In most other areas of maritime law, U.S. courts have been
equally reluctant to extend the thrust of what otherwise might
be looked upon as U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction. For example,
in cases involving the 1920 Jones Act and its provision that
"[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of
his employment may .. .maintain an action for damages at
law,"10 1 U.S. courts have almost uniformly held that the Jones
Act does not apply to foreign seamen on foreign flag vessels, no
matter where the seaman signed on or where the injury
occurred. 102
94 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 12, 14 (1963).
95 2 GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW AND REGULATIONS § 17:64 (1992 & Supp.
2007).
96 See Alexanderj. Marcopoulos, Flags of Terror: An Argument for Rethinking Mari-
time Security Policy Regarding Flags of Convenience, 32 TUL. MAR. LJ. 277, 284 (2007)
(defining "flagged out").
7 Kirsten Bohmann, The Ownership and Control Requirement in U.S. and European
Union Air Law and U.S. Maritime Law-Policy; Consideration; Comparison, 66J. AIR.
L. & COM. 689, 732 (2001).
98 McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 12.
- Id. at 20-22.
100 Id.
101 Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 27, 41 Stat. 988, 999 (1920) (current ver-
sion at 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (West 2007)).
102 See, e.g., Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 593 (1953).
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But in the more recent Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd.'" 3
decision, the United States Supreme Court seems to have con-
cluded-though by a very divided court that handed down four
separate opinions-that the law of the flag is not totally exclu-
sive. °4 At least some of the provisions in the recently enacted
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") should be applied to
foreign flag cruise vessels.1 1 5 The plaintiffs in Spector alleged that
these vessels denied them access to certain public places on
board the ships and discriminated against them in the assign-
ment of cabins by assessing surcharges.'0° A plurality of the
Court held that easily achievable remedies like eliminating
surcharges were valid, while other remedies like eliminating
structural raised barriers (that were presumptively allowed
under the international Safety of Life at Sea or "SOLAS" Con-
vention) were not. 10 7 Three members of the Court dissented on
grounds that, as there was no clear statement of coverage in the
ADA, it could not be said that Congress intended the ADA to
apply to foreign flag vessels.'0 8 In any event, this case provides a
very good idea of how controversial these issues can be. But at
least one thing can be said for the Spector decision: it was a deci-
sion that not only protected U.S. citizens but also citizens who
were disabled and who had contracted for their cruises and
boarded the vessels in the United States.
V. VERY RECENT EVENTS
In concluding this Article, a brief mention should be made of
two major cases that have occurred only within the past several
months. Both happen directly to involve the EC.
A. THE AIRLINE PRICE FIXING CASES
In February 2006, EC inspectors raided the European offices
of several major European and Asian airlines to search for evi-
dence as to whether they were conspiring to fix transatlantic air
freight rates. 0 9 At the same time as these raids were occurring
103 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (plurality opinion).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 125.
106 Id. at 133, 134.
107 See id. at 138-39.
108 Id. at 149 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 See Sachi Izumi & Jason Neely, Global Airlines Probe Widens to Asia, REDORBIT,
Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/392205/globalair-
lines-cargo-probe widens to asia/; David Lawsky & Jeremy Pelofsky, Update 4 -
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in Europe, FBI agents in the United States were raiding the of-
fices of KLM, Air France, and other airlines in Chicago and else-
where, seeking similar evidence of a price fixing conspiracy. 1 0
The EC announced that it "has reason to believe that the com-
panies concerned may have violated (a European Union) treaty,
which prohibits practices such as price fixing."11 The Justice
Department made a similar announcement. 12 On August 1,
2007, BA and Korean Air Lines pleaded guilty in the United
States to charges that they had conspired to fix prices for passen-
ger and cargo flights." 3 Each agreed to pay a criminal fine of
$300 million to the U.S. government. 14 In addition, BA agreed
to pay a $247 million fine to the U.K. Office of Fair Trading." 5
Investigators from the U.S. Justice Department said that there
were three separate conspiracies-one overarching worldwide
cargo rate conspiracy, a second conspiracy involving only BA
and Virgin Atlantic on passenger fuel surcharges, and a third
involving U.S.-Korean rates.11 6 Although Virgin Atlantic and
Lufthansa were deeply involved in the illegal conduct, they were
granted amnesty because they were the first to report the illegal
activity and had cooperated in the investigation.'1 7 A number of
other international airlines are still under investigation.1 8
Meanwhile, on March 11, 2008, European investigators carried
out another series of raids or "surprise inspections" on this occa-
sion targeting Lufthansa, Air France-KLM, and perhaps others
over suspicions that the carriers had participated in other cartel
price fixing activities involving passenger flights between Europe
and Japan. 119
Airlines Raided in EU, US Cargo Probe, REUTERS, Feb. 14, 2006, http://today.reuters.
com/news/articlebusiness.aspx?type=basiclndustries&storyID=nL14520882&
from=business.
110 Izumi & Neely, supra note 109; Lawsky & Pelofsky, supra note 109.
111 Lawsky & Pelofsky, supra note 109.
112 Id.
113 Peter Kaplan &James Vicini, BA, Korean Air to Plead Guilty in U.S. Pice Probe,
REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessnews/idUSN013
5743520070801.
114 Id.
115 Andrew Compart, BA, Korean Air Plead Guilty to Price-Fixing, TRAVEL WKLY.,
Aug. 6, 2007; Adrian Schofield & Jens Flottau, BA, Korean See Mammoth Fines in
Price-Fixing Probe, AVIATION DAiLY, Aug. 2, 2007, at 1.
116 Compart, supra note 115.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Steve McGrath and Carolyn Hanson, EU Investigates Possible Price Fixing by
Airlines, WALL ST.J., Mar. 12, 2008, at A22; see also New Round of EC Collusion Raids
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As was to be expected, private antitrust lawyers in the United
States have in the meantime filed numerous treble damage civil
suits against all the airlines suspected to have been involved in
the criminal conspiracy. 120 All of these suits are pending,
though it was reported some months ago that Lufthansa had
agreed to pay $85 million to settle the suits that were brought
against it. 121 At the same time, BA and Virgin have both stated
they are not willing to pay any civil damages for the time be-
ing.122 It has since been reported, however, that in mid-Febru-
ary 2008, B.A. and Virgin agreed to pay an amount in excess of
$200 million to settle the treble damage private anti trust suits
that were brought against them in the U.S. federal district court
for their illegal agreement to fix fuel surcharges. 123
B. THE MIcRosoF-r CASE
As recently as September 17, 2007, Europe's second highest
court, known as the European Court of First Instance ("CFI"),
affirmed a decision of the EC, holding that Microsoft had
abused its dominant market position in Europe and fining
Microsoft $689 million.1 24 In Microsoft Corp. v. Commission,125
Microsoft was found to have abused its dominant market posi-
tion by engaging in the practice of what is generally referred to
as "bundling," designed to lockout competitors.1 26 This past
February 26, 2008, moreover, the EC imposed a fine on
Microsoft of $1.3 billion, the "largest fine [the EC] has ever im-
Target Carriers Serving Japan, ATW DALY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2008, at http://www.atw
online.com/news/story.html?storylD=12026.
120 David Knibb & Peter Conway, Cargo Probe Focuses on Surcharges, AaRuINE Bus.,
Apr. 1, 2006; John R. Wilke & Daniel Michaels, Lufthansa Offers to Cooperate in
Antitrust Probe - Deal Could Be Breakthrough in Price-Fixing Inquiry of the Air-Cargo
Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2006, at A3.
121 Compart, supra note 115.
122 Id.
123 Adrian Schofield, BA, Virgin Agree to $200 US Million Payout in Class Action
Suit, AVIATION DAiLY, Feb. 19, 2008, at 2; Settlement on Airline Price Fixing, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at C04. The airlines agreed to pay some $59 million to U.S.
passengers and almost $145 million for passengers in the U.K. 2 Airlines Settle Suit
on Fuel Fees, INT'L HERALD TRB., Feb. 16, 2008, at 11. Meanwhile, investigations
are continuing in other countries, and it has yet to be determined whether the
EC will be assessing its own fines in addition to the fines already assessed by other
governmental authorities.
124 Kevin J. O'Brien & Steve Lohr, European Court Faults Microsoft on Competition,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007, at Al.
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posed on a company."'27 This latest fine is reportedly to penal-
ize Microsoft for failing to comply with the earlier EC orders to
terminate its allegedly unfair competitive practices. 12
Looking at these Microsoft decisions in the context of the EC's
investigatory efforts in the airline price fixing cases just dis-
cussed, there are three significant (if tentative) conclusions that
scholars of this area of the law are already drawing from the
decisions.
First, the decisions demonstrate an increasing dedication on
the part of European regulators and reviewing courts to engage
in much the same kind of extraterritorial assertions of regula-
tory jurisdiction as have been common in the United States
since the 1945 Alcoa decision.129 While there have been other
similar cases handled and decided by the EC in recent years-
especially the General Electric and Honeywell merger case that
the EC found to be illegal in July 2001' 3 0-none of them carry
nearly the message as the more recent Microsoft and airline
price fixing cases.
Second, because the U.S. Justice Department in 2001 had
more or less approved the very same Microsoft conduct as Eu-
rope was now finding illegal under the EC's broad concept of
what is "abuse of a dominant [market] position,' 3 1 it appears
that Europe may now actually be one-upping the United States
in its zeal to protect and enhance competition within the Euro-
pean Union, if not throughout the world. It is certainly interest-
ing that, when U.S. Justice Department authorities were asked
for their views on the earlier Microsoft decision, the Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust criticized it and suggested that
"rather than helping consumers, [the decision] may have the
unfortunate consequence of harming consumers by chilling in-
novation and discouraging competition. "132 This statement
seems to imply that the EC's objective in its antitrust enforce-
127 Kevin Sullivan, E. U. Slaps Third Fine on Microsoft, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2008,
at DOI.
128 Id.
129 LOWENFELD, supra note 15.
130 Commission Decision 2004/134 of 3 July 2001, Case No. COMP/M.2220-
General Electric/Honeywell, 2004 OJ. (L048) 567 (EC), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf.
131 Case T-201/04, 2007 WL 2693858; see Press Release, U.S. Department of
Justice, Dep't of Justice and Microsoft Corp. Reach Effective Settlement on Anti-
trust Lawsuit (Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/
November/01 at 569.htm.
132 O'Brien & Lohr, supra note 124, at Al.
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ment efforts is primarily to protect corporate competitors, while
the objective of the U.S. Justice Department is to protect
consumers.
Finally, the airline price fixing investigation and the Microsoft
decision both suggest that Europe is growing increasingly active
in the area of asserting its prescriptive jurisdiction. At the same
time, the F. Hoffmann-La Roche decision and the increasing use
by U.S. courts of the doctrine of forum non conveniens both
seem to suggest that the United States is moving largely in the
opposite direction. Perhaps the law on both sides of the ocean
may one day meet at some midpoint.
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